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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Michael Comstock 
 
PRESIDENCY 
'When the Cat's away, the Mice will play' Gleb Pavlovsky, founder of 
strana.ru, on Putin's absence 
During President Vladimir Putin's well-publicized visit to America this month, the 
internal struggle for power and influence within the Russian executive branch 
took interesting turns. Following hot on the heels of Nikolai Aksenenko's ouster 
from the railways ministry, Emergencies Minister Sergei Shoigu's retreat into a 
clinic, and the rumored struggle of Mikhail Vanin to retain power within the State 
Customs Committee, the true purpose and manipulator of this mini-purge require 
some elucidation. 
 
The Auditing Commission is the arm and the General Prosecutor's Office the 
sword used in the Kremlin today for the removal of unwanted persons, as both 
Aksenenko and Shoigu learned recently. Headed by Sergei Stepashin and 
Vladimir Ustinov, respectively, the Auditing Commission initiates and directs 
investigation and the General Prosecutor's Office swings the final blow through 
criminal prosecution that can result in de facto removal from power (Aksenenko 
on vacation, Shoigu in the hospital). (WHAT THE PAPERS SAY, 6 Nov 01; via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database) Seen as the hand of Vladimir Putin working 
behind the scenes, the cases of Aksenenko, Shoigu and others now are joined 
by what seems to be an unexpected counterpoint. While Putin visited America, 
Stepashin, himself a former prime minister, initiated what may be viewed as an 
attack on Mikhail Kasianov, the current prime minister. Stepashin announced that 
the Auditing Commission had been making corruption-fighting recommendations 
which Kasianov was not implementing or responding to, and if the situation 
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continued, Stepashin would go directly to the president. (NTV, 14 Nov 01; BBC 
Worldwide Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
This highly publicized criticism of the government's policies was followed quickly 
by equally public questioning of the constitutionality of the Auditing Commission's 
tactics by PM Kasianov (who was in Spain at the time), pointing out that "the 
drawing of political conclusions is up to the president and government." 
(KOMMERSANT, 16 Nov 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The question 
arises that, since Mikhail Kasianov is a Putin appointee, why is the Auditing 
Commission under Stepashin attacking him? Given that the Auditing Commission 
is viewed as one of Putin's political weapons, this becomes even more puzzling. 
And to whom does the loyalty of Vladimir Ustinov and his prosecutor's sword 
belong? 
 
PM Kasianov is known to disagree with the criminal prosecution of Nikolai 
Aksenenko; however, his rebuff of Stepashin's tactics seems to constitute an 
unusually publicized tactic of keeping Putin's minions in line. Also interesting is 
that, thus far, Putin has not strayed into this apparently fratricidal conflict. 
Perhaps the dark hand of Putin is not as invasive as currently perceived, and he 
may be allowing, in fact, an internal power struggle to continue unchecked for 
two reasons: 1) to allow potential rivals to defeat one another; and 2) to 
determine which faction is the strongest so that he is bound to back the winning 
side. It could be also that Putin seeks the ouster of his own appointee. Kasianov 
became prime minister early in Putin's tenure and is not a full member of the St. 
Petersburg Clan. Perhaps the powers-that-be have decided to discard the 
appointee before he becomes too firmly established on his own merits and could 
be viewed as something other than Putin's mere appendage. One Moscow 
newspaper cites "sources from the Russian White House" as associating all 
recent attacks against high-ranking officials with Igor Sechin, manager of Putin's 
secretariat. (KOMMERSANT-VLAST, 1 Nov 01; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) This would give more weight to the notion that Putin's hand is indeed 
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the guiding force, since Sechin is one of his most trusted advisors and is seen as 
a potential replacement for Alexander Voloshin, who has supported Kasianov in 
the past. (MOSCOW NEWS, 7 Nov 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
Thus, Sechin certainly has a motive for pressuring the Auditing Commission to 
provide a target for the General Prosecutor's Office. 
 
Ustinov himself has been somewhat in the limelight, first with the ongoing Kursk 
investigation and now with the mystery and rumors surrounding the current 
infighting. In a 12 November television interview, he denied that he had received 
any pressure from the executive branch -- which is to be expected, since the 
pressure would have been applied earlier on, at the Auditing Commission stage -
- and managed to play up his personal role. Responding to questions about 
Shoigu's recent sudden and highly coincidental heart condition and its 
relationship to the investigation against him, Ustinov said, "Well, all our 
executives are ready to enter the Central Clinical Hospital because of the 
psychological stress under which we all work. We are all potential clients of the 
hospital. At any minute. And nobody would say that we are pretending to be ill." 
(KREMLIN PACKAGE, 12 Nov 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) In fact, 
right now it seems that all of the Russian executive branch is in a position, from 
one perspective or another, to become someone's target and hence a victim of 
the sudden and highly suspect heart condition caused by "psychological stress." 
By some accounts even Ustinov may soon fall prey to this very syndrome. 
(WHAT THE PAPERS SAY, 6 Nov 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Meanwhile, in a recent high-level gathering that focused on Russia's domestic 
and foreign policies, Putin met with Kasianov, head of the Kremlin Administration 
Aleksandr Voloshin, Security Council SecretaryVladimir Rushailo, Foreign 
Minister Igor Ivanov, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, and Interior Minister Boris 
Gryzlov. (ITAR-TASS, 24 Nov 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Notably 
absent were both Stepashin and Ustinov, who are nominally in charge of one of 
Putin's main campaign promises -- the reduction of crime and corruption. 
 4 
 
The chances are that President Putin is at the center of a maelstrom of political 
infighting that he loosely controls when possible and directs when necessary. 
The confluence of forces in the president's entourage contains elements both of 
the old school Muscovites and the new St. Petersburg Chekists, and this storm is 
likely to continue as long as Putin both benefits from and remains above the fray. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
REGIONS 
An open-and-shut place 
Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of Russia's "closed cities" - 
cordoned-off communities with coded names that were usually home to military 
installations, intelligence-gathering centers, factories producing nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons, and other secret enterprises conspicuously 
missing from maps -- were reopened under Article 27 of the new constitution, 
which guaranteed "complete freedom of movement to everyone legally present in 
the Russian Federation." Since that day, the cities that recently had sprung up on 
the map have been disappearing again, picked off one by one by the atomic 
energy ministry, the defense ministry, or the prime minister of the time. A city 
"disappears" when access is closed off to foreigners and to Russian citizens 
without special documents. Decree No. 755, signed by Prime Minister Mikhail 
Kasianovon 30 October, restricted access to six more cities -- bringing the 
estimated population living in closed cities to two million. (THE RUSSIA 
JOURNAL, 22 Nov 01; via Johnson's Russia List) 
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Not all of these locations are of security importance, however. One place that 
falls under Decree No. 755 is Siberia's Norilsk, Russia's northernmost city, home 
to large reserves of non-ferrous and precious metal deposits as well as the 
largest nickel producer in the world: Norilsk Nickel, which employs 80,000 of the 
270,000 residents. Overpopulation, the difficult industrial situation, high crime 
rates, AIDS, and drug use all have been listed as official reasons for closing the 
city, but the primary target seems to be the 35,000 "foreigners" -- nationals of 
former Soviet republics -- who live in the city permanently, and the hundreds that 
arrive in the city every month in search of a more affluent life. (RUSSIA TV, 1100 
GMT, 24 Nov 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The regulation becomes effective on 25 November, and the local airline (KrasAir) 
already has stopped selling tickets to "foreigners," with the exception of 
Belarusians, who have special status in the Russian Federation under the 
Russian-Belarusian Union agreement. Now, any foreigners wishing to visit 
Norilsk will need a special Russian visa or an invitation from a relative or an 
employer, which they will also need to register with the Federal Security Service. 
(AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 25 Nov 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
It has been made more than clear that two categories of "foreigners" exist. 
Norilsk Nickel spokeswoman Yelena Kovaleva explained that the rules will be 
waived for visitors "from further abroad," especially Norilsk Nickel's foreign 
investors. The violation of Article 27 of the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation, aimed not at protecting state security but at retaining a special status 
for the industrial city, has outraged human rights groups. (THE RUSSIA 
JOURNAL, 22 Nov 01; via Johnson's Russia List) 
 
JUDICIARY 
Duma passes reform bill 
Two years ago, President Putin entrusted Deputy Chief of the Presidential 
Administration Dmitry Kozak with reforming the national judiciary. Kozak's 
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original ambitious plans were curbed by the debate that broke out over the 
limitations on the rights of prosecutors, the removal of immunity for judges, and 
the restructuring of certain legal procedures. 
 
On 22 November, the Russian State Duma passed the new Criminal Procedural 
Code in the third and final reading by a vote of 289 to 93 with no abstentions. 
The new code requires court sanction for searches and arrests, and a 
prosecutor's approval for launching a criminal investigation (starting in January 
2004); and improves the system of preliminary investigations, requiring a case 
rejected by a prosecutor to be closed, and allowing persons other than a lawyer 
(close relatives, for example) to defend the accused following an appeal. (RIA, 
1431 GMT, 22 Nov 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The bill also extends the requirement of a jury trial for serious crimes (such as 
murder and rape) to all of Russia's regions (starting in July 2003). The main 
change to Kozak's original plans is the preservation of the provision concerning 
the immunity of judges. In fact, to initiate an administrative or criminal 
investigation of a judge, an investigator needs permission from the prosecutor, 
an enlarged board (20-25 judges from the same area), and three judges of a 
higher court. (VEDOMOSTI, 23 Nov 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Not only prosecutors, however, were upset about the changes in the balance of 
power. Opponents of this reform note transitional lapses between the current 
system and the new system (for example, the new code provides for jury trials to 
be introduced throughout the Russian Federation on 1 January 2003, while the 
current code loses effect at the beginning of 2002) and the redefinitions of 
procedures that remove the presumption of innocence from the Criminal 
Procedural Code (for example, under the new code, a judge will not be able to 
drop charges even if he sees no proof of the crime -- the charge needs to 
continue until the defendant is proven innocent). (THE RUSSIA JOURNAL, 23 
Nov 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database)  
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Others who criticize the bill assert that corruption will not be eliminated, that the 
only real change will be a shift from judges who depend on local authorities to 
judges who depend on the Kremlin. Sergei Pashin, a law professor and retired 
judge, observed that, through a tighter grip on the courts, the presidential 
administration would gain more control over "political and economic conflicts 
including everything from real estate disputes and company takeovers to 
scandalous election procedures and the delineation of powers between Moscow 
and the regions." 
 
It remains to be seen whether the new Criminal Procedural Code will be a "legal 
cornerstone" to be improved as time goes on, or a reshuffling of authority by the 
powers that be, with little concern for the Russian citizen. (THE MOSCOW 
TIMES, 23 Nov 01; via Johnson's Russia List) 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
If it looks like a party 
While the new "Civil Forum" was specifically depicted as a non-political entity, the 
role it is likely to play and the amount of hype that it has been receiving from the 
government make it sound like a political party. And it is not only "hype" that the 
state treasury is doling out. This pet project of Gleb Pavlovsky, Kremlin political 
consultant and the head of the Effective Policy Foundation, has been reported to 
cost anywhere between $1 and $1.5 million. 
 
President Putin was the first speaker at the Forum. He addressed the need for a 
dialogue between the state and civil society and acknowledged the fact that "civil 
society cannot be established at the state's initiative, at the state's will, much less 
in accordance with the state's plans" and suggested that the government's "major 
and essentially only task" is "to form the institutions maximally favorable for its 
development." The Russian president noted that among the "representatives of 
various civil institutions" present at the forum were "opponents of the government 
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on vital issues of state policy" and added that he considers that "a normal 
phenomenon and actually helpful in a democracy." (VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 22 
Nov 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database)  
 
The president stayed for about an hour, listening to the speeches as a pile of 
petitions (three armfuls for protocol chief Oleg Rakhmanin) grew. (THE 
MOSCOW TIMES; 22 Nov 01; via Johnson's Russia List) Other state officials 
who spoke at the forum generally tried to push their own agenda: State Duma 
Chairman Gennady Seleznev spoke about a proposed law on lobbying, 
Constitutional Court Chairman Marat Baglai complained about the State Duma's 
attempts to abolish the Court, and Russian Ombudsman Oleg Mironov promoted 
the establishment of the institute of regional ombudsmen. Still others discussed 
the process of organizing the Forum. Gleb Pavlovsky criticized the media for 
being disloyal. (KOMMERSANT, 22 Nov 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
One newspaper that would qualify as "disloyal," Novye izvestia, noted that the 
event was, in a way, a trap: Human rights activists either could attend, and 
appear to be in concord with the government, or ignore the event and allow the 
Kremlin to dismiss them as unwilling to accept a chance to do something 
constructive. Novye izvestia also taunted Vladimir Putin specifically for not 
playing "the old-new state anthem so dear to [his] heart," because the organizers 
knew that most human rights activists "would refuse to rise to their feet, and that 
the opening of the forum would be marred." (NOVYE IZVESTIA, 23 Nov 01; via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
President Putin sent a greeting to another social organization -- the Federation of 
Jewish Communities of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which held its 
second congress on 19 and 20 November. The congress, headed by Russia's 
chief rabbi, Berel Lazar, was attended by over 400 delegates from 140 of the 143 
communities in the Federation as well as Russian Culture Minister Mikhail Y. 
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Shvydkoi, an envoy of President Vladimir Putin, and representatives of the 
Muslim community and the Russian Orthodox Church. 
 
In the opening speech of the congress Lazar declared that Jewish communities 
are "witnessing miracles today, we see Jewish schools, Jewish kindergartens, 
charity canteens, various cultural programs and lots of music and artistic groups 
in towns where Jewish life had not existed at all." He noted that emigration to 
Israel has declined, that Jews who previously were afraid to admit their 
background now proudly announce it and can practice their faith freely and 
comfortably. The rabbi praised President Putin's contributions to the improved 
conditions -- symbolic acts such as lighting a national menorah last Hanukkah. 
Lev Leviev, the chairman of the Federation of Jewish Communities, also praised 
the Russian president, noting that Putin went out of his way to make contact with 
American Jewish organizations during this month's visit to the United States. 
 
At the same time, representatives who attended the congress noted that the 
presence of anti-Semitism can still be felt, and that periodic hate crimes like the 
desecration of Jewish cemeteries and synagogues still occur. They also 
discussed the extremist attacks against other minorities, especially against 
African students and immigrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia regions. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1624 GMT, 19 Nov 01; BBC Worldwide Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database, and LOS ANGELES TIMES, 21 Nov 01; via 
Johnson's Russia List) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Michael Varuolo 
 
Shake-up at the GRU? 
On 5 November President Putin visited the military intelligence (GRU) 
headquarters in Moscow and delivered two clear messages for that security 
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service. In the first message he relayed a sobering description of what he 
expects from the GRU in the future: "We have moved away from large-scale 
combat operations, the role of special bodies has been substantially enhanced." 
(INTERFAX, 1205 GMT, 5 Nov 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1105, via World News 
Connection) Then he continued to stress the importance of international 
cooperation in the "war on terrorism" and praised the work of the security service 
in Chechnya, noting that 421 special forces officers from the GRU have been 
killed in action since the summer of 1999. His speech was a clear indicator that 
the service will continue to be asked to shoulder the load in the "anti-terrorism" 
campaign and can expect to conduct even more operations, especially in 
Chechnya. He referred also, especially, to the GRU's role in "foreign affairs." 
 
His second message was more direct and not delivered from the public podium. 
President Putin is not happy with certain aspects of the GRU's performance and 
is stressing that these aspects must be corrected rapidly so that the service will 
be operational for use in the near future. According to Defense Minister Sergey 
Ivanov, Putin "has set the task of raising the department's efficiency in all 
spheres - technical, specialized, traditional and law-enforcement." (INTERFAX, 
1225 GMT, 5 Nov 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1105, via World News Connection) By 
telling the GRU what parts within the organization need to be overhauled, Putin is 
defining clearly the service's future role, that is, a role that focuses upon "anti-
terrorism" and other operations which require direct military force. His comments 
both public and private indicate that he is ready to increase the role of the GRU 
on the international scene, provided that its overall performance is improved. 
 
Recent activities in Afghanistan and Chechnya constitute one reason that Putin 
expects the GRU to become more efficient, but it is not the only reason. In 
addition, Kaliningrad Oblast' is rapidly becoming a major topic of discussion 
within the Russian Federation. As the EU and NATO look to expand, they may 
envelop Kaliningrad's borders from all sides. Russia wants Kaliningrad to take 
advantage of the lucrative economic and political opportunities created by the 
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region's location. However, the oblast' is in desperate straits and facing security 
challenges. 
 
These challenges recently have forced the FSB to coordinate a special 
conference to address the implementation of Russian Security Council 
resolutions on the oblast'. (ITAR-TASS, 0744 GMT, 8 Nov 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
1108, via World News Connection) They also have prompted border officials to 
move towards unprecedented cooperation with their Lithuanian counterparts in 
combating smuggling and drug trafficking. Furthermore, the state security organs 
have become entrenched as tax collectors within the region because 
governmental control of businesses has declined to the point of ineffectiveness. 
(ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 10 Nov 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1113, via World News 
Connection) Although the FSB has been given the lead in security issues within 
Kaliningrad Oblast', President Putin's appearance at the GRU headquarters 
serves as a reminder that another intelligence service is waiting in the wings if 
the FSB proves unable to handle the situation in the oblast'. Until then, the GRU 
must confine most of its operations to Chechnya. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Bethel 
 
More than meets the eye -- the Crawford Summit 
The summit between Presidents Bush and Putin at the Bush ranch in Crawford, 
Texas was one of the most hyped meetings between two heads of state in recent 
memory. So much was said in the Russian and American media about this 
conference that, whatever the final outcome, it wouldn't match the 
prognostications and predictions made by leaders and pundits in both countries. 
(See THE NIS OBSERVED, 7 Nov 01) Among the most publicized unresolved 
issues prior to the summit were the status of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaty of 1972, Russia's role in arming Iran, its putative status in the Middle East 
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"peace process," and Moscow's longstanding desire to be included in major 
world fora such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). (AP WORLDSTREAM, 
14 Nov 01; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Clearly the two leaders had different public and private agendas. Apparently 
President Bush's personal aim was to deal with the Russian leader in an informal 
setting and to achieve a new camaraderie in Russian-US relations, Texas-style. 
Bush said, "The best diplomacy starts with getting to know each other -- and I 
want him to know my values and I want to know his values." (COX NEWS 
SERVICE, 14 Nov 01; via lexis-nexis) For Putin, Russia's focus in the near-term 
relationship with the US was threefold: First, to put the spotlight on the ABM 
treaty and demonstrate Russian largesse by allowing the US to continue testing 
toward the development of a National Missile Defense (NMD) capability, while 
giving the perception of full support to the US "war on terrorism"; second, to re-
establish Russia's place as an important and equal partner with the US and 
perhaps with NATO while, in general, increasing Putin's profile in America and 
among Americans (ITAR-TASS, 0500 GMT, 11 Nov 01; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database); and third, to confirm the resurgence of Russian regional 
hegemony. (RUSSIA TV, 1830 GMT, 13 Nov 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Wrapped up in these competing agendas was the gray area of an informal 
meeting with formal expectations. Many hoped to see concrete resolution of the 
issues at hand to include some movement towards a revision of the ABM treaty. 
The actual result rested mainly on a de facto agreement to reduce the aggregate 
number of warheads on both sides. This decision simply reflects the declining 
dependence on these weapons as a cornerstone of both countries' national 
defense. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 16 Nov 01) 
 
When the summit broke up on 15 November, it seemed that very little had been 
accomplished. No formal agreements were signed and limited official 
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pronouncements were made. However, does that mean that the overall effect of 
the summit was nil? Hardly. 
 
Senior National Security Council staffers provided NIS Observed with some 
insight into the actual results of the Crawford Summit. First, the flurry of public 
posturing concerning Russia's position on NMD by Foreign Minister Ivanov and 
President Putin (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 24 Oct 01) meant that by the time 
the summit began there was uncertainty in the US camp as to the real Russian 
stance on the important ABM question. During the summit the actual position of 
both countries was clarified. The Russians are willing to bend but not break on 
ABM. It appears that they would be willing to make some concessions allowing 
the US to continue to develop the capability, while maintaining that a full-scale 
fielding of an ABM system is counter to both the 1972 treaty and to long-term 
Russian interests. However, once NMD is fully mission capable, there would 
indeed be further negotiations concerning its fielding. The Russians want near-
term advantages in the areas of increased trade (WTO membership) and desire 
development money in the form of long-term loans. (ITAR-TASS, 1601 GMT, 16 
Nov 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) It appears Putin 
would be willing to back off on ABM rhetoric if the US would support Russia's 
desires to expand its economy.  
 
In terms of increasing Russia's profile in the US, Putin scored high marks. He 
participated in several press conferences culminating with his widely publicized 
(both in the US and Russia) appearance on a National Public Radio call-in 
interview which included hundreds of would-be callers and more than 2,000 e-
mails. (INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT, 15 Nov 01; via npr.com). He addressed a 
variety of subjects during the two-hour program, though he was circumspect in 
most. In the end, the interviewer, rather fulsomely, summed up the exchange by 
thanking Putin for "sharing so much of himself with us." 
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Russia's role in the Middle East "peace process" is still undefined as yet though 
Moscow's regional profile is increasing with the support of the US. That Foreign 
Minister Ivanov met with Syrian and Jordanian officials in New York as part of 
Putin's US trip is further indication of America's enhancement of Russia's visibility 
in ongoing negotiations. (ITAR-TASS, 1538 GMT, 12 Nov 01; BBC Monitoring, 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
According to senior NSC sources, the main US goal was to keep the Russians 
firmly in the "anti-terrorism coalition." But running a close second was the need to 
keep the Russians from pushing for a scaling back of NMD testing and to keep 
the US from having to move toward a position of unilateral withdrawal from the 
ABM treaty. In fact, there was no indication that the Russians were wavering in 
their public support of the anti-terrorism effort. According to President Putin, they 
are considering ways to increase participation in the coalition. (RUSSIA TV, 2000 
GMT, 14 Nov 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The US 
seemed at pains not to challenge Russian assertions of hegemony in some 
portions of post-Soviet space and even to inflate Moscow's relative importance. 
(See THE NIS OBSERVED, 10 and 24 Oct 01) Further, Putin never really 
pressed the ABM issue and has toned down his rhetoric on the issue. It appears 
the US administration was satisfied with the outcome of the meeting. (THE NEW 
YORK TIMES, 16 Nov 01) 
 
In the final analysis, the Crawford Summit yielded some clarification of the near-
term future of US-Russian relations. A lot was agreed on a handshake and verbal 
basis, much to the chagrin of the US Congress (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 16 
Nov 01), while written agreements are yet to be determined. As for the counter-
terrorism "coalition" and Russia's desire for more representation in international 
fora and increased global economic opportunities, Russia continues verbal 
support for the US stance and the US is inclined to support Russia's request for 
membership in such organizations as the WTO. On the thorny issue of the ABM 
treaty an understanding was reached. Heretofore, the debate has been fought 
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out through thrust and parry via official pronouncements, recriminations, and 
justifications. Now, it seems there is a tacit understanding of what the future 
holds for NMD and ABM. For the near term at least, the debate will be on the 
back burner. That is, for at least as long as continued need for the anti-terrorism 
"coalition" is apparent. 
 
Move over Churchill -- the Brits want Russia in NATO! 
In a strange twist of history, the UK is leading a serious effort to bring Russia into 
some sort of increased participation in NATO. This could include everything from 
creating a new forum for the Russians to have increased input to NATO 
leadership all the way to a full Russian veto over decisions by the alliance. (THE 
NEW YORK TIMES, 22 Nov 01) 
 
Leading the charge are none other than UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and NATO 
Secretary-General George Robertson (also a British citizen). News of this 
proposal leaked out in the Russian and Ukrainian media nearly two days before 
Robertson and Blair made separate, but similar proposals, on 22 November. 
(URYDOVYY KURYER, 20 Nov 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) But that did not dampen the enthusiasm of the two-pronged British 
offensive aimed at the Russians. 
 
Robertson has offered the Russians the immediate opportunity to participate in 
NATO discussions on counter-terrorism and other "selected topics" agreed to by 
the existing member states. (REUTERS, 23 Nov 01; via lexis-nexis) For his 
initiative, Robertson claims he has the full backing of President Bush, PM Blair, 
and the rest of NATO. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 22 Nov 01) What is even more 
shocking is that Robertson has offered the so-called "19 plus 1" format, which 
would mean that on issues on which Russia is invited to be a participant, 
Moscow would have a vote, and therefore a veto over NATO policy and planning 
initiatives. (REUTERS, 23 Nov 01; via lexis-nexis)  
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For Blair and Robertson, these efforts could be driven by various reasons. 
Perhaps they believe in the sincerity of Russian intentions. Or, perhaps, they feel 
that by bringing the Russians into the debate and giving them a vote, one might 
obviate Russian verbal sniping over actions handed down from NATO's highest 
decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC). 
 
However, it is to Russia's advantage to have such a relationship that would allow 
Moscow to decide what issues are "in" and which are "out" as far as a Russian 
de facto veto is concerned. Clearly Putin and his foreign policy team will resist full 
membership for two key reasons. Most importantly, full NATO membership would 
force the Russians to lay open their entire military apparatus to the scrutiny of the 
other 19 members. Such scrutiny would reveal fully the woeful condition of the 
Russian military and hamper efforts at regaining great-power status. Secondly, 
Moscow would have to comply with any number of NATO rules about arms 
dealing. Right now Putin and his foreign policy team are effectively using the 
international arms market as a tool to gain new allies and re-establish key 
alliances which have languished since the fall of the USSR. (See THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 24 Oct and 7 Nov 01) Russia certainly would have to answer in the 
NAC for its recent major arms deal with Iran and its longstanding supply to Iraq 
and other countries with horrible human rights records. Even now, Putin already 
has begun to make it clear that Russian foreign policy cannot be questioned, but 
that the only issue for discussion is how Russia and NATO can fight terrorism 
more effectively together. Further, in all foreign policy initiatives the Russian 
president has left no doubt that Russian national interest will always come first. 
(ITAR-TASS, 0500 GMT, 11 Nov 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
Finally, full NATO membership would be a less effective approach for Moscow as 
opposed to a series of bilateral relationships with individual NATO members. 
Through such agreements Moscow can exploit NATO weaknesses and 
maneuver from a position of strength. Thus the more formal the relationship 
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between the Russians and the alliance becomes, the less room Putin has to 
wiggle. However, even allowing the Russians a seat at the table, let alone a 
chance to vote, would constitute a real shift in the relationship between Russia 
and NATO and the effect of any such a shift remains to be seen. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Walter Jackson 
 
Creative accounting 
As discussion continues concerning Moscow's military modernization plans, more 
is being reported on the current state of the Russian military. It is obvious that 
President Putin knows he needs to do something substantial. Military reform 
characteristically has a champagne appetite and a beer budget, and Russian 
reform is no exception. Realizing that adequate military housing is on the 
forefront of military reform (at least in the minds of the troops), the Russian 
government has decided to speed up the Presidential Housing Certificates 
Program. Under this plan every servicemen -- 210,000 in all -- will receive a 
housing certificate. The problem of finding 210,000 houses throughout Russia 
isn't addressed. In reality, the program's planners underfunded the actual cost of 
adequate housing by nearly 50%, but the government promises to close this gap 
in 2002. (NEZAVISIMOYE VOYENNOE OBOZRENIE, 2 Nov 01; What the 
Papers Say, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) So Moscow now can say every 
serviceman has a housing certificate: problem solved, Soviet style. But since that 
doesn't actually provide any additional and affordable housing, it doesn't solve 
any problem. 
 
Robbing Piotr to pay Paul wait, one day Paul will become Piotr 
Another initiative to help fund the military pay and allowances increase would 
come at the expense of the retired. According to an analysis of a proposed new 
Duma bill on military pay (a new system of calculating remuneration for military 
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personnel), the two proposed 2002 pay increases will be offset by a 13% income 
tax and the elimination of servicemen's current housing allowances. Since the 
calculations do not take into account inflation, 2002 will end with the servicemen 
in a still deeper hole, albeit with a fatter paycheck. 
 
The long-range prospects for career servicemen are worse. According to the 
Duma, "People retired from the military service will also be deprived of their 
benefits; however, these pensioners will not receive any compensation at all. 
Serving officers with over 20 years in the military have been receiving pension 
payments since 1996; these will be cancelled, and the money reallocated toward 
young officers. The reasoning is very simple here: the military needs to be 
younger, times have changed and today there is no need to strengthen and 
support the political loyalty of the mid-level and senior officers." (NEZAVISIMOYE 
VOYENNOE OBOZRENIE, 2 Nov 01; What the Papers Say, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Kudrin presented 
President Putin's military reform bill to the Duma on 15 November. Benefits such 
as housing allowances, utility and telephone subsidies will be abolished. Further, 
the pension allowance will be abolished and pensions will be calculated 
differently. (VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 16 Nov 01; What the Papers Say, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database)  
 
Whatever the revised pension looks like, it is obvious that it will be smaller. The 
question is, will the young Russian servicemen notice? Will this policy add to or 
detract from the stated goal of building a modern Russian military? In the short 
term, it appears that servicemen's benefits only get better on paper (if that). In 
the long term, if true benefits don't improve quickly, Russia will continue to be 
plagued by poor quality personnel in all ranks, unable to attract and keep quality 
personnel. The word does get around, even in Russia, so to what do future 
military retirees have to look forward? Then again, retirement has never been a 
Russian priority, and that appears still to be the case, at least for the foreseeable 
future. 
 19 
 
Apples and oranges 
In an attempt to answer the question "Is the Russian military doomed to fall 
apart?" The writer Vadim Soloviev attempts to compare the current plight of the 
Russian military to its counterpart in the West. He stated "We once asked a 
British army veteran what the British military personnel would do if they weren't 
being paid on time, like their Russian counterparts. The British army veteran's 
answer was brief: 'military camps would be empty within a month.' " The 
journalist notes that "of course, the Russian army will not disperse, as the 
Russian mentality is different." (NEZAVISIMOYE VOYENNOE OBOZRENIE, 2 
Nov 01; What the Papers Say, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) But the 
Russian military is not the British military. This comparison is naïve at best. The 
British (as well as the US) realized long ago the importance of a well-trained and 
-paid military. So, yes, most Russian servicemen go to work even if they are not 
getting paid (as do many other Russians). But Soviet-era notions are not 
dispelled easily from either side of the equation. Hence the old adage "they 
pretend to pay us and we pretend to work" remains relevant, and is one 
explanation for poor combat readiness and morale. 
 
NMD, do as I say, not as I do 
One of many NMD bones of contention between Moscow and Washington has 
been over the adherence to the 1972 ABM treaty. One layer of that argument 
concerns the capabilities of radar sites. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 7 Nov 01) 
Moscow believes that Washington should close the Vardo Norway radar site as a 
quid pro quo for the closure of two of Russia's overseas bases in Vietnam and 
Cuba. An article from the Russian Center for Arms Control, Energy and 
Environmental Studies, titled "Vardo Radar: Unfriendly Act or Violation of the 
ABM Treaty," raises the question whether the Vardo radar site (operated jointly 
by the US and Norway), which purportedly can track Russian intercontinental 
missiles from launch to impact, actually violates that treaty. The article claims 
that the deployment of such systems outside the US does violate the 1972 ABM 
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Treaty. (Center for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies at the 
Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, updated 15 Oct 01; via WebPages) 
Analysis of the treaty, in fact, shows that "there had been some concern over the 
possibility that surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) intended for defense against 
aircraft might be improved, along with their supporting radars, to the point where 
they could effectively be used against ICBMs and SLBMs, and the Treaty 
prohibits this. While further deployment of radars intended to give early warning 
of strategic ballistic missile attack is not prohibited, such radars must be located 
along the territorial boundaries of each country and oriented outward, so that 
they do not contribute to an effective ABM defense of points in the interior." (US 
Department of State, Treaties and Agreements WebPages, updated 20 Jan 01) 
Thus, it raises the question of whether Russia will close every radar site in each 
of the newly independent states. It is doubtful, to put it mildly. Of course, in 1972 
those sites were within the Soviet Union. Times have changed, and this is one of 
many examples why the treaty needs to be updated. The only reason that Russia 
has to fear anyone tracking its missiles (from within the European Theater) is to 
deny NATO and the US time to respond to an unprovoked attack. 
 
An interesting sidenote emanated from a recent Russian report that, last year, 
China successfully carried out two ballistic missile launches in the 3,000km range 
and that Russian services detected all the Chinese missile launches and tracked 
them to the point of impact (clearly flaunting Russia's ABM capabilities against 
China). (ITAR-TASS, 1331 GMT, 5 Nov 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1105, via World 
News Connection) Of course, the Russian sites mentioned above also include 
many in other former Soviet states. Although the joint operation of these radar 
sites likely falls under the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Collective 
Security Treaty, does that supersede the 1972 ABM treaty? Clearly it does; thus, 
in effect, Russia has already abandoned the 1972 ABM treaty. 
 
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 
Fueling the Russian economy 
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Two of the biggest boons to the Russian economy this year have been the 
relative high price of oil and increases in arms exports. In fact, matters appeared 
so favorable that President Putin had been proposing accelerated payments of 
Russia's world debt. But all that was before the bottom fell out of the oil market, 
driving prices well below the bottom line calculated in the Russian 2002 budget. 
Now, instead of finding areas on which to spend the windfall surplus, Putin must 
find a way to fund military reform initiatives, for example, without increased 
revenues. How can Putin manage to pull this off, especially with the global 
economy in an apparent recession? 
 
Ye olde shell game 
There are two predominant reasons why the Russian economy did so well in 
2001. Revenues were significantly up on the year due to the higher-than-
expected price of oil (although the projected drop in oil prices is likely to have the 
opposite effect in 2002). (IZVESTIA, 6 Nov 01; What the Papers Say, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) The second reason is that arms exports are also 
significantly higher this year. Thanks to the unilateral "repeal" of the 
Chernomyrdin-Gore Pact, sales to (cash-rich) Iran already are boosting arms 
sales figures (including construction of nuclear power facilities). Russia's defense 
giant Rosoboroneksport (which celebrated its first birthday recently, with 
anticipated 2001 sales reaching $3.2 billion) reported that it has sold 30 MI-8 
military transport helicopters to Iran at a price of $150 million. (VEDOMOSTI, 1 
Nov 01; via RFE/RL Security Watch) 
 
While Putin looks for ways to pay off Russia's debt, the US continues to pour 
large sums into Russia and other former Soviet republics in assistance, including 
the cleanup of Russia's nuclear, chemical and biological ecological disasters. 
(See THE NIS OBSERVED, 7 Nov 01) As Vneshekonombank head Andrei 
Kostin has stated, the drop in oil prices allows Russia to reopen negotiations with 
creditors to restructure the national debt, and possibly even to "raise the issue of 
lightening the debt burden, including to write-off part of it." (INTERFAX, 16 Nov 
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01; via RFE/RL Security Watch) Now the only way of generating the revenue that 
Moscow desperately needs to meet its 2002 budget (approved after the third 
reading) is through increased weapons sales, and increased foreign aid. That is 
nothing to brag about. 
 
Old lamps for new 
Putin (anticipating this predicament, no doubt) was already devising some rather 
dubious ways to reduce Russia's debts. One approach has been to get rid of 
stockpiled inventories of (older) military hardware in lieu of hard currency 
payments (and to offer them as state-of-the-art weapons). Austria, for example, 
apparently is one creditor willing to receive military exports to satisfy debts. 
According to Russia's Deputy Minister for Economic Development and Trade, 
Mikhail Dmitriev, Russia will pay off its Austrian debt with "high-technological 
hardware." It is reported also that Austria and Russia will launch a joint venture to 
build MiG-110 passenger airplanes in Austria. (NASH VEK, 31 Oct 01; What the 
Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) Apparently, Austria's view is 
"a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." Without the substantial R&D and 
other start-up expenses, building Russian-designed aircraft could wind up being 
a very lucrative business venture for Austria, worth accepting the barter for 
Russia's debt. 
 
According to Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov, during his three day visit 
to Spain, Russia hopes to pay off the nearly $1billion debt to Spain by offering 
private investment opportunities and delivery of goods (such as trawlers and 
other ships). Apparently Spain is looking at building a third Campa-Prio 
(Campomos Foods) factory in Russia, and may be willing to write off some debt. 
These proposals are still in the negotiations phase, and Spain does hope to 
obtain some hard currency as well. (IZVESTIA, 15 Nov 01; What the Papers Say, 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The best of all ways to pay off debts is with 
other people's money. According to Putin's economic adviser, Andrei Illarionov, 
another alternative is to pay down the foreign debt with a portion of Russia's 
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Central Bank gold or currency reserves. (KREMLIN PACKAGE, 5 Nov 01; via ISI 
Russia Publications)  
 
Easy come, easy go 
One ironic aspect concerning Russia's debt to Spain lies deeply buried in history. 
During the Spanish Civil War, Stalin "convinced" the Spanish government to 
send its gold bullion reserves to Russia for "safekeeping." And safe they have 
remained. Why not just pay off Spanish debt with Spanish gold? Oil and arms 
sales bring badly needed hard currency to help fund the Russian economy. At 
the moment, Russia is just another oil-producing country, without a "superpower" 
bargaining position. Will Iran support Russia's position vis-à-vis OPEC (not to 
decrease Russian oil production significantly) now that the flow of Russian arms 
and technology has resumed? At the moment the answer appears to be no. And 
as Moscow feels the impact of the decreasing price of oil on its 2002 budget, 
Russia might remember not to count its chickens before they are hatched. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Kuchma's choices 
The last few weeks have seen a number of important decisions from President 
Leonid Kuchma. Unfortunately, these decisions have underscored what appears 
to be his primary purpose -- to keep as much power as possible in his hands. To 
do so, as these decisions show, the president seems willing both to delay 
necessary reforms and to allow his country in many ways to fall back into the 
Russian orbit. 
 
One of Kuchma's most important actions in the last month was the appointment 
of a new minister of defense. His choice of an army general continues the status 
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quo at a time when most experts agree major changes are needed in the 
Ukrainian military. Kuchma himself repeatedly has stated the necessity for 
civilian control of the military. "Such control is needed," he said, "to accelerate 
military reforms and foresee the accountability of state management organs for 
the activity of Ukraine's armed forces." (UKRAINIAN NEWS, 14 Nov 01; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) As has become his habit, however, Kuchma's 
actions did not parallel his statements, and a career military man was appointed. 
 
When asked about the discrepancy between what he said and what he did, 
Kuchma referred to the upcoming parliamentary elections. "I do not want to turn 
the Defense Ministry into the election headquarters of any political party or 
entity," he explained. (UKRAINIAN NEWS, 14 Nov 01; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) In other words, he did not want to face the possibility of losing control. 
Given the history of new Defense Minister Volodymyr Shkydchenko, it seems 
Kuchma will achieve this goal. There appears to be little question that 
Shkydchenko is superbly trained and has had a stellar military career. But his 
major qualification for this job seems to be his ability to remain silent. 
 
In analyzing the choice, the Ukrainian newspaper Zerkalo Nedeli examined 
Shkydchenko's three-year stint as chief of the Army's General Staff. "During 
these three years," it said, "he did not give a single interview. Shkydchenko 
obviously avoided any publicity. It appears that Kuzmuk generated the majority of 
ideas and initiatives at the ministries." (ZERKALO NEDELI, 16 Nov 01; BBC 
Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) It also appears that Kuzmuk 
may continue to do so -- serving as a "presidential advisor" on military matters. 
So, while there may be talk of reform, and while some cosmetic changes in fact 
may be occurring, nothing has truly changed at the top. 
 
Kuchma also seems to be working hard to see that nothing changes in the 
parliament. With the announcement that his chief of staff will serve as the head of 
the "For a United Ukraine" election bloc, President Kuchma has relegated the 
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Gongadze tape scandal to a footnote, eliminated all talk of reforming the electoral 
system, and ensured that a pro-presidential bloc will continue to control a 
significant portion of the parliament. The bloc, which is the most significant 
challenger to Viktor Yushchenko's movement, unites a number of the country's 
oligarchs and most powerful politicians. Despite the fact that this bloc now draws 
limited popular support (in fact, significantly less than Yushchenko's "Our 
Ukraine" group), the massive monetary and political resources at its disposal 
bode well for its success. And its new head, Presidential Chief of Staff Volodymyr 
Lytvyn, is known to be a master of spin. He managed, for example, to downplay 
very effectively charges that his voice was heard during several questionable 
conversations on the Gongadze tapes. His work for his president during the 
same scandal was, of course, no less impressive. As Zerkalo Nedeli noted, "He 
does not publicize what he does behind the scenes. He simply does what he 
does. And the people affected very seldom know who pressed the button on the 
remote-control bomb." (ZERKALO NEDELI, 17 Nov 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Meanwhile, Yushchenko finds himself in an interesting position, as two of the key 
administrators of his bloc are "Kuchma men." When Roman Bezsmertnyy 
(presidential representative to parliament) and Yuri Yekhanurov (presidential 
representative on administrative reform) began working with Yushchenko, it 
seemed as if the president and his former premier might have reached some 
type of understanding. Lytvyn's new position raises questions about this 
arrangement. In particular, it leaves one wondering how the two men will cope 
with any disagreements that may arise in the future between Yushchenko and 
Kuchma -- if agreements, in fact, will be tolerated at all. Once again, it seems that 
Kuchma has braced himself and his supporters against any challengers. His 
strategy has not been solely domestic, however. Kuchma's administration has 
also worked hard recently to increase the support given it by Russia.  
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After the 11 September attacks in the US, it appears that Ukraine made a choice 
to tie most of its responses to Russia. Increased Russian diplomacy calling for a 
Russia-US and Russia-NATO rapprochement has led to calls for closer Russian-
Ukrainian ties. The head of the National Security and Defense Council, Yevhen 
Marchuk, for example, has suggested that Ukraine should cooperate more fully in 
the CIS (and in particular the Collective Security Treaty). Meanwhile, Russia and 
Ukraine continue to increase their military cooperation. Recently, Vasyl Hureyev, 
the Ukrainian Minister of Industrial Policy, announced that the two countries are 
preparing an agreement "to avoid unnecessary rivalry of their defense industries 
on the external markets." (ITAR-TASS, 1918 GMT, 9 Nov 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
1111, via World News Connection) Clearly, Russia is concerned about Ukraine's 
continuing efforts to increase its share of the world arms market (last year, the 
country was the world's eighth largest exporter). For its part, Ukraine seems 
willing to risk losing at least some of that market share. 
 
The countries have also signed an agreement restructuring Ukraine's gas debt, 
and moved forward with the plan to begin parallel operation of their electricity 
grids. But all of this is too little, according to one of the president's closest 
advisors, Volodymyr Horbulin. In a recent editorial, Horbulin outlined a bipolar 
foreign policy, suggesting that Ukraine could be both a future member of the 
European Union and of the CIS Collective Security Treaty. He also suggested 
that "the joining of efforts in the fight against international terrorism provides 
additional opportunities for joint movement of Ukraine and Russia into Europe." 
(ZERKALO NEDELI, 27 Oct 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
Not surprisingly, these statements were met with concern -- if not outright alarm -
- by more right-leaning political parties and organizations. The two Rukhs, for 
example, issued a statement urging Ukraine immediately to request membership 
in NATO. 
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Of course, no such statement would receive much attention in today's climate of 
Russian-Western togetherness. And perhaps this concentration on Russia by the 
West has helped many of Ukraine's politicians to believe they have no other 
choice than to "hitch their wagon" to Russia. Or perhaps -- like many decisions 
made in recent weeks -- it is simply the easiest choice to make, with the fastest, 
most lucrative short-term rate of return. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
CHECHNYA 
Show trial backfires 
The trial of Salman Raduey, a notorious Chechen commander, and several other 
Chechen defendants is rapidly turning into a public relations fiasco for the 
Kremlin. Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov's questioning has failed to elicit 
self-incriminating confessions from the defendants, who are charged with 
participation in illegal armed formations and are standing trial in Makhachkala, 
Dagestan. 
 
Among the defendants is Turpal Ali-Atgeriev, former security minister of 
Chechnya who has fully and resolutely denied any guilt. Moreover, he told the 
courtroom that in the summer of 1999 he contacted the Russian special services 
to inform the federals of the radical opposition's plans to attack Dagestan. 
Atgeriev said he did so because he wanted to prevent another war in the 
Northern Caucasus, but he said his warnings were ignored. (gazeta.ru, 20 Nov 
01) 
 
Atgeriev's testimony should come as no surprise since press accounts of his 
three attempts to obtain law enforcement cooperation have been available all 
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along. In fact it seems that not only did Atgeriev warn the Kremlin, but he also 
sought Moscow's assistance against the radicals. 
 
Atgeriev met with Sergei Stepashin in November 1998 and March 1999 to 
develop joint crime-fighting efforts. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 3 Mar 
99) In July 1999, Maskhadov sent Atgeriev as his envoy to Moscow to discuss 
such cooperation and prepare for a meeting between Presidents Maskhadov and 
Boris Yel'tsin. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 21 Jul 99, and OBSHCHAYA 
GAZETA, 9 Sep 99) Atgeriev was arrested in the VIP lounge of Vnukovo airport 
after a week-long stay in Moscow, as he was about to return to Chechnya. After 
a day in Matrosskaya Tishina prison, he was released due to Stepashin's 
personal intervention  
 
Primakov's striking revelations 
Yevgeni Primakov, whose term as prime minister began in September 1998 and 
coincided with the worsening crisis in Chechnya, described Maskhadov's difficult 
position in his recent book, VOSEM MESYATSEV PLUS (Moscow: Vargius, 
2001, pp. 100-103). Primakov explains that the kidnapping in September 1998 of 
four foreign telecom workers (three British and one New Zealander) represented 
a personal affront to Maskhadov, who had been well received in London only a 
few months earlier. Maskhadov announced that he was taking the search for the 
hostages and the punishment of the guilty parties under his personal control. 
This signaled a serious effort to combat the criminal elements. At a rally in 
October, Maskhadov invoked blood vengeance (krovnaya mest) against those 
who conduct the hostage trade. Maskhadov demanded that all units not under 
the control of the general staff be disbanded and that opposition bases be 
liquidated. At the same time the head of the Shariah security announced that 
operations to free hostages would be held and criminal groups would be 
destroyed. These operations, however, were not decisive and the opposition 
responded with assassination attempts against Maskhadov's allies. 
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Primakov comments that in the context of these events "[I]t became clear that 
Maskhadov thought more and more about advancing Russian-Chechen 
relations." Hence Primakov persuaded the president to authorize a meeting in 
Vladikavkaz. Ingushetia's President Ruslan Aushev and South Ossetia's 
President Alexander Dzasokhov served as intermediaries for the meeting, which 
was held on 29 October 1998. The main discussion between Maskhadov and 
Primakov took place behind closed doors. Here is how Primakov describes it: 
 
This is what I learned from that conversation: 
Maskhadov and Basaev don't just represent different interests within Chechnya 
such as different teips [extended family networks], or groups of field commanders 
-- they also represent different ideologies. In response to my direct question 
Maskhadov said, "I think that the independent Chechnya should exist in its 
present boundaries, but Basaev thinks differently. He would like to try the 
Chechen experiment in other bordering territories, first of all in Dagestan, through 
which he can seek access to two seas, the Black Sea and the Caspian." 
 
Basaev's program made him Russia's irreconcilable foe whereas Maskhadov 
showed a willingness to discuss many problems connected with "Chechnya's 
independence in the context of a single economic space with Russia, single 
currency" and so forth. 
 
Certain Russian circles have close contacts with Maskhadov's opposition. 
Specifically he named [Boris] Berezovsky, who, according to him [Maskhadov] 
"supports them financially, in part through paying ransom for freed hostages, and 
provides radio communications." Maskhadov said that Berezovsky's main partner 
was Movladi Udugov at that time the Chechen 'foreign minister.' 
 
Maskhadov was counting on us to support him with arms, money, and to help 
restore, not so much Grozny, as four or five main industrial plants -- mainly of the 
petrochemical field. He wanted the reconstruction of these plants to be 
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accomplished by Russian regions bordering Chechnya. We decided (I had 
[Sergei] Stepashin, MVD minister and [Ramazan] Abdulatipov, minister for 
nationalities policies with me) on cooperation between the law-enforcement 
agencies to combat hostage-taking and criminality, the restoration of several 
enterprises in Chechnya, paying compensation to victims of the deportations of 
1944 who live in Chechnya, and the payment of pensions for Chechen retirees 
from the federal pension plan. 
 
The main result of the meeting was that in return for Moscow's fulfillment of 
agreements reached at Vladikavkaz and earlier meetings, Maskhadov promised 
to "begin a public struggle and finish off the terrorists." 
 
After the Vladikavkaz meeting, Primakov presented a detailed report to Yel'tsin 
and gave the appropriate directives to the ministries concerned. "The president 
supported the draft decrees for the MVD," writes Primakov. However, Primakov 
does not say whether the measures were implemented. For his part, Maskhadov 
removed Movladi Udugov from the position of foreign minister on 30 October, 
that is, immediately upon his return to Grozny. In this way, Maskhadov signaled 
his willingness to carry out the agreements reached at Vladikavkaz. 
 
It is clear from Primakov's account that Maskhadov had warned the Russian 
government that Basaev would try to use force against Dagestan. It is obvious 
that Maskhadov sought Russian military and political support to suppress 
criminal elements that were in part funded and manipulated by influential figures 
in Moscow. The Vladikavkaz meeting seemed to have produced efforts to enlist 
Russian military support against the criminal elements. Atgeriev's consultations 
with law enforcement bodies followed on Maskhadov's warnings to Primakov. 
 
So, why the war? 
If the Chechen president and the security minister were seeking cooperation with 
Russian law enforcement against the radical elements, why did Russia go to war 
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against them? Primakov comments in regard to the origins of the first Chechen 
war that "The main difficulty lay in the fact that the Chechen question was 
integrated into the main political crisis in Moscow." (p. 96) The same can be said 
about the origins of the second war. It served Putin's political ambitions to stoke 
nationalist ferment through a war in Chechnya. As the renowned war 
correspondent Anna Politkovskaya told her Cambridge audience on 19 
November, Russian officers told her repeatedly "we are fighting for a rating" in 
the presidential elections. Twice in one decade a war in Chechnya was used to 
resolve a power struggle in the Kremlin. 
 
The current confusion regarding talks between Russian and Chechen 
representatives reveals that there is still no policy-making process. Talks were 
held on 18 November between Kremlin envoy Viktor Kazantsev and Chechen 
negotiator Akhmed Zakaev in the presence of Besim Tibuk, leader of Turkey's 
Liberal Democratic party who apparently was serving as a guarantor of Zakaev's 
security. No substantive information about the content of the talks or the 
subsequent Chechen proposal has been made public. A few days later SPS 
leader Boris Nemtsov suggested that the leaders of ethnic republics, Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan, could serve as intermediaries. Plans for drawing up a 
Chechen constitution were being aired by Beslan Gantemirov, a highly 
controversial Chechen figure who is now an aide to Kazantsev. Radio Liberty 
reported on 26 November that Chechen commanders meeting in the south of 
Chechnya endorsed Maskhadov's efforts to end the war. It also pointed out the 
complete confusion among the authorities: While Kazantsev speaks of further 
talks for the specific purpose of ending hostilities, other generals are carrying out 
massive cleansings aimed explicitly at capturing Maskhadov. Zakev says that the 
Kremlin is trying to decide whether to end the war or continue it. There is plenty 
of intrigue and contradictory initiatives, but this hardly adds up to a policy-making 
process. 
 
Hostage's plight emphasizes state failure 
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The human tragedy behind the absence of policy is evident in the unfolding story 
of a Russian captive in Chechnya. A Russian officer, Lt. Col. Sergei Boryaev, 
was taken hostage on 29 September. While his fate remains uncertain, it's quite 
clear that the authorities only hamper efforts to obtain his release. The absence 
of a structured procedure for obtaining the release of prisoners bodes ill for the 
300 other officers and soldiers being held captive in Chechnya. 
 
Many Western media outlets reported that Boryaev was executed on 11 
November by his Arab captors in Chechnya. However, at this writing, the 
execution of Boryaev remains unverified and some express hope that he is still 
alive. "Otherwise I would not send my man, the father of four children, to Vedeno 
for talks," Vyacheslav Izmailov, an expert in releasing hostages, told the 
gazeta.ru news service on 14 November. In his 19 November article in Novaya 
gazeta, Izmailov confirmed that there was reliable information from his Chechen 
intermediary that the Russian officer was still alive. The intermediary has helped 
to obtain the release of hostages in the past and carries specific proposals that 
are backed by an influential Chechen commander. 
 
The federal forces remain unwilling to provide even minimal support to these 
efforts. Izmailov is asking for two things: to coordinate activities with GRU (which 
has already bungled a raid in late October) and safe passage for his intermediary 
through checkpoints in Chechnya. Instead, the man was held up for several days 
at the Khankala base for questioning. 
 
The seemingly false reports of the execution emanate from a 13 November 
report from Qatar's Kavkaz Tsentr website which quotes Khattab as saying, "add 
one to nine" in an apparent reference to nine Russian officers who were 
executed in the Spring of 2000. Khattab is an Arab commander who leads a unit 
of roughly 200-300 radicals in Chechnya. 
 
 33 
The Kavkaz Tsentr report uses oblique language and provides no details about 
the execution or evidence that it occurred. This should have tipped off reporters 
to seek confirmation. After all, on previous occasions they had been treated to 
very graphic images of executions. Moreover, Kavkaz Tsentr and Khattab 
specialize in sensationalism and have spread false reports on many previous 
occasions. Movladi Udugov, the chief propagandist of the site, purportedly has 
been working with Russian security services to foster the hostage trade. Instead 
of obtaining confirmation, Western news agencies chose to treat Khattab's hint 
as fact.  
 
Negotiations concerning the release of hostages should be handled by the 
presidential commission for freeing members of the armed forces. But employees 
of this body have not been able to travel to Chechnya since June 2001 due to a 
lack of funding. In the budget approved by the Duma for 2002 there is no 
provision for work concerning the freeing of hostages. According to Izmailov's 15 
October Novaya gazeta article, the budget does not provide a separate line item 
for the commission, which used to employ officers from the MVD, FSB, and other 
services. 
 
In a radio broadcast shortly after Boryaev's abduction, Khattab promised to trade 
him for the release of 25 Chechen women picked up during "cleansings." 
Members of Boryaev's unit offered $300,000 and the release of Yakub, one of 
Khattab's lieutenants, but could not begin consultations about the women. "They 
aren't to be found. Do you understand?" gazeta.ru quoted them as saying. 
 
The Boryaev incident reveals the woeful inadequacy of the state. In the absence 
of clear procedure, the task of seeking the release of hostages falls on private 
citizens like Izmailov, a retired MVD major, now a war correspondent for Novaya 
gazeta, and his colleagues. They take calls from frantic relatives and try to 
arrange the release of hostages with the aid of Chechen intermediaries. In some 
cases there are exceedingly complicated transactions which may involve 
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promises of clemency or the release of Chechen prisoners. But even the most 
dedicated efforts by a handful of journalists and human rights activists are clearly 
inadequate to the task at hand. " I'll be able to help one in five or one in ten, " 
says Izmailov. 
 
Both sides, the criminals and the state, exploit hostages for publicity. Although 
Khattab made loud proclamations about the release of 25 women, he never 
presented a complete list of names. For its part the military refused to hold 
"demeaning talks with the Arabs, " says Izmailov to gazeta.ru. "If this was not 
about PR and counter PR, then we would not be talking solely about Boryaev," 
he continues, "but also about two other officers of the Vedeno command, also 
lieutenant colonels. They have been in captivity since July. No one is looking for 
them. There is no news of them." 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami and Michael Donahue 
 
The 'war on terrorism': Impetus for new cooperation 
The United States' involvement in Central Asia has provided the impetus for a 
new period of cooperation, especially between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 
 
The two countries have decided, independently of Russian influence, that they 
must work together to ensure regional stability. Relations between the two 
countries have not always been cordial, mainly because of long-standing 
territorial disputes stemming from the Stalinist period, during which time frontiers 
were redrawn with little consideration for ethnic boundaries. Furthermore, Uzbek 
President Islam Karimov has been heavily criticized by President Nursultan 
Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan because of his failure to subdue the threat posed by 
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). 
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On 15 and 16 November, Karimov traveled to Astana for intensive talks, which 
resulted in an agreement for the delineation of 96% of the 1,200-mile Kazakh-
Uzbek border, and a deal under which Uzbekistan will provide natural gas to 
Kazakhstan's southern districts. (KAZAKHSTAN DAILY DIGEST, 20 Nov 01; via 
Eurasianet) Both presidents apparently fear that the United States will withdraw 
from Central Asia once its goal of defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan has been 
achieved. 
 
Over and above providing assistance to US-led coalition efforts in Afghanistan, 
both leaders also are using the broad rubric of "terrorism" as a convenient 
excuse to tighten their own grips on power. 
 
In Uzbekistan there has been a recent spate of mass arrests directed against 
believers of the Muslim faith, and human rights organizations are expressing 
deep concern over Washington's change of stance. In February 2001, the State 
Department said that Uzbekistan's already poor record had "worsened." But 
immediately following Karimov's expression of support for the US, it ceased 
including Uzbekistan in its "Countries of Particular Concern" category. 
(EURASIANET HUMAN RIGHTS, 12 Nov 01; via Eurasianet) 
 
In Kazakhstan, meanwhile, the security services' discovery of two purported 
assassination plots against Nazarbaev has provided an opening for action. Prime 
Minister Qasymzhomart Toqayev has linked the plots to reformers in the cabinet 
and parliament. He has called for the removal of the entire cabinet, but most 
especially of Minister for Labor Alikhan Baimenov and Vice Premier Oraz 
Zhandosov who he claims, belong to a new movement called "Democratic 
Choice." Unless these officials are removed, Toqayev added, he himself would 
resign. (KAZAKHSTAN DAILY DIGEST, 20 Nov 01; via Eurasianet) 
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The United States' renewed interest in the Central Asian states does not 
necessarily include their internal problems, and the region's leaders are seizing 
an obvious opportunity to consolidate their rule. 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
Putin's last stand in Central Asia? 
In light of the ever-increasing American influence in Central Asia, most 
prominently in Uzbekistan, during the ongoing "war on terror," Russian President 
Vladimir Putin seems to be searching for new ways to assert Russian hegemony 
over this former Soviet imperial domain. Already, President George W. Bush has 
linked American security guarantees to the use of Uzbek air and logistics bases 
for military operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The giants of America's 
energy industry, as well as the US Department of Energy, have a significant role 
in the extraction and transportation of Caspian Sea oil, including owning a 
significant portion of the recently completed Caspian Pipeline Consortium linking 
Kazakhstan to Russia. Of further interest is the recent American overture to 
Tajikistan, until recently considered the bastion of Russian influence in the 
region. 
 
Currently, Tajikistan, which shares a 750-mile border with Afghanistan, permits 
use of its airspace only for humanitarian and search-and-rescue operations. In a 
recent stopover during his Central Asian tour, US Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld reached a tentative agreement with Tajik President Imomali Rahmonov 
on the possible use of Tajik airbases and the expansion of airspace permission 
to include military sorties. (EURASIA INSIGHT, 5 Nov 01; via Eurasianet) In an 
ironic twist of fate, one of the three airfields currently being assessed for 
suitability in handling a major American air contingent is Kulyab airbase, located 
approximately 60 miles from the Afghan border. During the 1979 invasion of 
Afghanistan, the Soviets refurbished and expanded Kulyab in order to make it 
capable of handling both fighter aircraft and large transport planes, precisely the 
dual-role capability for which the US has been looking. (EURASIA INSIGHT, 5 
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Nov 01; via Eurasianet) While it is extremely unlikely that a single American 
fighter would remain on Tajik soil after the demise of the Taliban, any long-term 
agreement with the international community regarding use of Kulyab is likely to 
challenge the Kremlin's ongoing pursuit of "zones of influence" over newly 
independent countries. 
 
Much like UN and NATO operations in the former Yugoslavia, post-Taliban 
peacekeeping/nation-building monitoring force logistics and staging bases are 
unlikely to be confined to the country of conflict. The proximity of Kulyab and its 
potential utility as an entry point for supplies and personnel make it ideal for 
continued use long after the last rounds have been fired in Afghanistan. The 
influx of personnel and capital required to expand the airfield, build logistics 
staging areas and airfield housing, and improve road networks into Afghanistan, 
could potentially jumpstart the Tajik economy and make it less reliant on 
"(Step)mother" Russia. Tajikistan, one of the world's poorest countries, has relied 
on the Russians in economic and security matters since 1991, including the use 
of Russian Army elements along its southern border with Afghanistan. In the light 
of a decade of patronage towards Dushanbe, Putin is taking continued exclusive 
relations for granted. 
 
In an effort to counter growing American influence in the region, President Putin 
met both with Tajik President Rahmonov and with the leader of the Northern 
Alliance's political wing, Burhanuddi Rabbani, during a stopover on his return 
from the APEC Shanghai Summit late in October. (EURASIA INSIGHT, 25 Oct 
01; via Eurasianet) By focusing so closely on growing American influence in the 
region and trying so persistently to counter it, Putin may be overlooking a more 
gradual loss of Russian influence in Dushanbe at the hands of the international 
community as a whole. In the light of past experience and current American 
statements, the United States has little interest in remaining in Central Asia over 
the long haul. Excepting possible threats to US interests in the free-market 
exploitation of Caspian Sea Oil, it is unlikely that America will focus on Central 
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Asia after the war. However, the influx of humanitarian assistance into Tajikistan, 
albeit destined ultimately for Afghanistan, will speed up exponentially the benefits 
of the global economy for the Tajiks. Already Germany has dispatched its foreign 
minister, Joschka Fischer, to Dushanbe in order to discuss improving the Tajik 
infrastructure to facilitate the movement of humanitarian support through 
Tajikistan. (SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 22 Oct 01; FBIS-WEU-2001-1021, via 
World News Connection) 
 
In light of the fact that the European Union as a whole provides Tajikistan with 
almost 20 million euros in assistance annually, to concentrate solely on 
competing against growing American influence in Tajikistan would be 
shortsighted for Mr. Putin. When all is said and done, Dushanbe will benefit 
economically from the current war and the post-war arrangements, and Russia 
may lose its hegemonic aspirations in Central Asia, but not necessarily to the 
rival it thinks. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Michael Varuolo 
 
Back at the beginning 
Russian President Putin's recent visit to the United States raised hopes that 
Russia might soften its obdurate opposition to Baltic aspirations to join NATO. 
Indeed, Putin's closing comments in the US encouraged personalities both in 
Riga and Vilnius to express their expectations that Moscow might be inclined to 
accept the eastward expansion of the alliance. 
 
Membership in NATO and the EU long have been focal points of the Baltic 
foreign policies that view NATO as the answer to the security concerns of the 
three republics. Indeed, Harri Tiido, the Estonian foreign minister, went so far as 
to say that, "besides the traditional hard security risks, NATO would help reduce 
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the so-called soft security risks, like organized crime and terrorism." (ETA, 0900 
GMT, 14 Nov 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1114, via World News Connection) 
 
The road to NATO membership has been long and arduous for all three states. 
They have worked closely with NATO to prepare their membership action plans 
(MAP) and fulfill the other necessary requirements. NATO has aided in this 
process by providing oversight and guidance to ensure that the founding 
principles of the alliance are met. However, Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
states that all parties will seek and contribute to the development of peaceful 
relations with others in the international system. For the Baltic states this 
explicitly refers to their individual relationships with Russia. Although Article 2 
does not state that members must have ratified borders, it does imply that 
accepted borders are necessary for the development of relations with 
neighboring countries. 
 
Despite having received the appropriate documents in 1996, the Russian Duma 
has failed to ratify the existing borders, apparently believing that by failing to 
ratify deputies somehow can affect the Baltic republics' chances of NATO 
accession and EU membership. This is simply not a valid argument. All three of 
the Baltic states have clearly delineated borders, which in fact have been 
recognized de facto by Russia. Troops from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Russia patrol the borders. Not only does Russia work with officials of the Baltic 
states along these boundaries, but Moscow has demonstrated its acceptance of 
the borders in the international arena. In a recent conference in Tallinn, border 
guards from the Baltic republics, Russia, and other European countries met to 
discuss greater cooperation between their agencies. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 
5 NOV 01; via lexis-nexis) 
 
As the peoples of the Baltic states hail the acceptance, albeit de facto, of their 
borders and the warming of relations between NATO and Russia due to the "war 
on terrorism," President Putin's closing remarks warrant careful reading. "NATO 
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was established as a force to counter the Soviet Union. There are no threats 
from that country today, because that country is no more. In its place there 
emerged many new countries, including new, democratic Russia. Russia may 
prove helpful in neutralizing the threats we are facing today. Russia recognized 
the role of NATO in the modern world and it is prepared to expand cooperation 
with it. If we change the quality of relations between Russia and NATO," Putin 
continued, "the question of NATO's expansion will become irrelevant." (ITAR-
TASS, 0419 GMT, 16 Nov 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1116, via World News 
Connection) This appeared to imply that he might accept NATO membership for 
the Baltic republics only if the alliance undergoes dramatic alteration. This does 
not represent a reversal of Putin's position or even a softening, but rather a 
reassertion. President Putin always has maintained that as long as NATO 
remains a collective defense pact, excluding Russia, Moscow will view expansion 
as unacceptable. He merely took the opportunity to utilize the American media to 
reaffirm this position. 
 
Article 5 constitutes the foundation of the alliance: An attack on one will be 
considered an attack on all. Any change in the nature of this foundation would 
undermine the alliance. For the Baltic states a change in the NATO Charter 
which affects this security basis would be unacceptable. President Vaira Vike-
Freiberga of Latvia stated this succinctly when she said, "I am aware that there 
are real threats and we must be prepared. This is one of the reasons why we 
want to become a member of NATO." (BNS, 1017 GMT, 8 Nov 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-1108, via World News Connection). At the conclusion of the recent summit 
between Presidents Putin and Bush it appears, for the time being anyway, no 
progress can be noted with regard to NATO. 
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